北京大使館発、秘密002964号電信(FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING, S E C R E T, BEIJING 002964)
主題、国務副長官スタインバーグの武大偉氏とのｕｎｏｆｆｉｃｉａｌ会見(DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S ｕｎｏｆｆｉｃｉａｌ MEETING WITH 武大偉 )
¶1. (SBU、不詳) XX不詳
¶2. (SBU) Participants:[米国側出席者、実名記載]
１The Deputy Secretaryスタインバーグ国務副長官，
２Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing北京駐在ハンツマン大使
３Joseph Donovan, EAP Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Stateアジア太平洋局担当ドノバン次官補
４Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, Joint Chiefs of Staff統合本部ライディッグ准将
５Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI9.11以後に設けられたDirector of National Intelligenceの北朝鮮担当トラニ大使
７Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense国防次官補ミッチェル
８RDML Bradley Gerhrke, U.S. Defense Attache in Beijing北京駐在防衛武官ゲルク准将
９Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretaryスタインバーグ副長官の補佐官パーク
１０Ryan Hass, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker)大使館政務担当ハス(記録係)
１１James Brown, Interpreterブラウン通訳(武大偉の中国語⇒英語に)
¶3. (S秘密) SUMMARY [要約]: XXX不詳 Deputy Secretary Steinberg stressed that the U.S. remains committed to
the Six-Party process and to the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.
The Deputy Secretary emphasized the importance of continued, close contact
with the 武大偉 on North Korea and stressed that the U.S. would not compromise its relations with China or other Six-Party Talks partners in pursuit of bilateral contact with the DPRK. The Deputy Secretary noted that the U.S. was not willing make concessions to entice North Korea to abide by its previous commitments. Ambassador DeTrani assessed that the DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its nuclear program, but that it had not made a strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons. 武大偉encouraged the U.S. to engage in direct contact with the DPRK, which he
felt could spur the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. xxxxx speculated
that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il's deteriorating health and his desire to cement
a legacy provided an opportunity for the resolution of the nuclear issue.
In order to protect the gains that had been made and also to advance the
Six-Party Talks, 武大偉asserted, all parties had to remain committed to the September 2005 joint
statement on denuclearization. 武大偉reiterated China's commitment to implementation of UNSC Resolution 1874 and offered a read-out following Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang. End Summary.
Positive U.S.-China Relations[前向きの米中関係]-----------------------------
¶4. (S秘密) Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with 武大偉 for a fifty-minute discussion on North Korea. 武大偉 noted that the Deputy Secretary would have an opportunity to meet with a number of Chinese leaders during his visit, which spoke of the importance that China attached to its relationship with the U.S., as well as the respect that Chinese leaders held for the Deputy Secretary. 武大偉 commented that the Deputy Secretary's visit occurred on the heels of President
Obama and President Hu's September 22 meeting in New York. The two Presidents
had reached consensus on key issues in the bilateral relationship, and
now it was each side's responsibility to work together to implement that
consensus. 武大偉 described himself as an outsider to U.S.-China relations, and even as an outsider he had met the Deputy Secretary three times over the past year, a fact that 武大偉 said spoke volumes about the positive development of U.S.-China relations.[この高官は「中米関係の専門家」ではないが、過去1年に3回スタインバーグと顔を合わせている。中国政府を代表して北朝鮮問題を語る資格をもつのは、戴秉国国務委員か、武大偉6カ国会議の中国代表、いずれかと見てよい。戴秉国は近年、米中対話の主役であるから、専門家ではないと謙遜するはずはない。そこから武大偉と推定できる]
U.s. Is the missing element[欠けている米国ファクター]---------------------------
¶5. (S秘密) 武大偉 raised "The Red Cliff," a John Woo-directed movie about the Battle of Red Cliffs 1,801 years ago along the banks of the Yangtze River, as a metaphor for the current diplomatic situation with North Korea.[中国高官は映画「レッドクリフ」を用いて、「借東風」の故事を説明したが、このような説明に反発する米側関係者もいたことは、ソウル発の電信から分かる] At that time in China, three states were in conflict. Two overmatched southern states had joined forces to fight the numerically-superior northern state. The two southern states planned to use fire as a weapon to defeat the northern state, but in order to do so, the southern states required an easterly wind. The battle ensued in November, when the prevailing winds normally came from the west. During the battle, an easterly wind arrived, which enabled the southern forces to use fire as a weapon to defeat the superior northern forces. This story was an aphorism, 武大偉 suggested. In the story, the southern forces had all of the elements in
place except for the crucial one -- the east wind ("dong feng"). The same was true with the Six-Party Talks. There have been positive
interactions among the parties to the Talks, and the U.S. and China saw
eye-to-eye on issues. There was only one missing element: only the U.S.
could bring the east wind, 武大偉declared. 武大偉は米国が東風を吹かすことが必要と力説。
武大偉 rationale behind high-level visits to dprk[北朝鮮への高官訪問の理由付け]------------------------------
¶6. (S秘密) 武大偉 explained that 戴秉国 President Hu's Special Envoy[武大偉は、戴秉国が胡錦涛国家主席の特使であると説明した。ここから戴秉国ではなく、武大偉であることが裏付けられる], and Premier Wen Jiabao would pay a visit October 4-6. The purpose of
these visits was to persuade North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.
North Korea's "supreme leader" called all of the shots. China
sometimes had sharp debates with North Korea at the working-level, but
when big matters were raised to the "supreme leader" for a decision,
they were often easier to resolve. That was why China had sent 戴秉国 and would send Premier Wen to Pyongyang in rapid succession, according
¶7. (S秘密) 武大偉 explained that his visits to Pyongyang had left him with a clear impression
that bilateral contact with the U.S. was the issue most on the minds of
North Korean leaders. It was possible to revive the Six-Party Talks, but
only if the U.S. would engage North Korea. 武大偉observed that the U.S. was at times capable of taking diplomatic initiative,
other times was cautious in its diplomatic approach. In this instance, the U.S. had been overly cautious. China hoped the U.S. would initiate contact with North Korea, which 武大偉 stressed was crucial to re-convening the Six-Party Talks and to the larger goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Chinese assessment of kim jong-il[金正日に対する中国当局の評価]---------------------------------
¶8. (S秘密) 武大偉 allowed that DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il might have some realistic ideas,
and stated that Kim Jong-Il wanted to engage the U.S. soon. Kim had been
impressed by President Clinton's visit, and had come away from his meeting
with President Clinton with an understanding that there were areas for
discussion with the United States. 武大偉 stressed his personal feeling that if the U.S. made substantive contact
with North Korea, then positive progress on the nuclear issue was within
reach. The U.S. and China should not put off resolution of North Korea's
nuclear issue indefinitely, 武大偉 stressed.
¶9. (S秘密) 武大偉 stated that he had read a statement after President Clinton's visit that
suggested that Kim Jong-Il was in good health, and speculated that the
medical experts that accompanied President Clinton to Pyongyang might have
arrived at a different conclusion. 武大偉 suggested that Kim Jong-Il would like to resolve outstanding issues in the near future because his health might not permit him to put off decisions for too long. This dynamic created a favorable moment for resolving the nuclear issue; it was important for the U.S. and China to seize this moment and bring North Korea back to the path of consultations and negotiations, 武大偉 stressed.
U.s.-prc shared assessment on North Korea[北朝鮮に対して米中の評価が一致した箇所]-----------------------------------------
¶10. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for 武大偉 insights on North Korea and for China's decision to send senior representatives to North Korea to press for the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. and China shared ommon goals and a common assessment of the path forward on North Korea. Both countries had the confidence to send parallel messages to North Korea, and when we were able to engage North Korea at high levels, it reinforced shared U.S.-Chinese objectives. Regarding U.S.-DPRK contacts, the Deputy Secretary suggested, China already understood from Ambassador Bosworth's September 3 visit and our ongoing bilateral contacts that the U.S. was prepared to have direct contact with North Korea as a way to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks.
Learning the right historical lessons[歴史の教訓に学ぶ]-------------------------------------
¶11. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary noted that some people carried history forward through
their own experiences. It was important that the U.S. and China drew from
their shared history of dealing with North Korea to determine the best
way forward. The Deputy Secretary noted that the chief obstacle to progress
at the end of the Bush Administration had not been a lack of U.S.-DPRK
contact. In fact, the frequency of direct contact became a source of criticism,
with some observers suggesting that the U.S. had too much direct contact
with North Korea and not enough coordination with Six-Party partners.
¶12. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary observed that North Korea had established a pattern
of provocation followed by conciliation to ameliorate pressure from the
international community resulting from its actions. It was imperative to
break this pattern, which was counter-productive to shared U.S.-Chinese
goals on North Korea.
Key elements to current approach[現在のアプローチのカギ]--------------------------------
¶13. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary asked 武大偉 what missing element, or "easterly wind," would lead to a change
in North Korea's behavior and produce a different outcome than during the
1980s and 1990s. The Deputy Secretary offered three elements that could
affect North Korea's decision-making.[諸葛孔明「借東風」の故事]
¶14. (S秘密) The first element was the unified position on North Korea among the Six-Party
Talks partners. The U.S. wanted to ensure that if it proceeded to bilateral
contact with North Korea, such contact would not undermine in any way the
strong unity of approach among Six-Party Talks partners.
¶15. (S秘密) The second key element was the strong unity of action among Six-Party
Talks partners, particularly in implementation of UN Security Council Resolution
1874. It would be important for Six-Party Talks participants to continue
full implementation of this resolution, the Deputy Secretary stressed.
¶16. (S秘密) The third key element would be to articulate clearly to North Korea precisely what steps the Six-Party Talks partners expected the DPRK to take to irreversibly denuclearize, while also making clear exactly what benefits the DPRK would derive from such actions. The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that significant work had already been undertaken in this regard, but much more work was needed to establish a specific, common understanding among Six-Party Talks participants.
¶17. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary acknowledged that although he was not certain whether
these three elements would be enough to convince North Korea at a strategic
level to decide it was better off without nuclear weapons, the U.S. was
willing to test the proposition. The U.S. was prepared to have bilateral
contact with North Korea to determine whether a different outcome was possible
now that the Six-Party Talks participants held a clear, unified position.
U.S. Caution on bilateral u.s.-dprk contacts[米朝二極対話への米国の警戒感]--------------------------------------------
¶18. (S秘密) The U.S. "caution" in re-engaging with North Korea stemmed
from its interest in ensuring that any contact would be done on the clear
basis that bilateral contact was not about managing North Korea's nuclear
program, but rather about taking concrete measures to dismantle it, the
Deputy Secretary stated. North Korea had recently sent several positive
signals, including through 武大偉and State スタインバーグ meetings, North Korean public comments that walked back its previous rejection
of the Six-Party Talks, hints that there could be a new formation for international
talks on denuclearization, and statements that North Korea understood the
goal was denuclearization. Premier Wen Jiabao's October visit would present
another opportunity to convey to North Korea that the Six-Party Talks partners
shared a common position.
¶19. (S秘密) On the current status of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks, the Deputy Secretary explained that there had been exchanges in recent days through the New York channel on modalities for bilateral contacts. The U.S. wanted to ensure that if direct engagement occurred, the DPRK would participate at a high level. This would be the only way to determine whether North Korea was serious about engagement. While the U.S. was prepared to have bilateral contact with North Korea, it was not willing to engage in extended bilateral negotiations in which an agreement would be reached outside of the Six-Party Talks framework. The only way to ensure an effective solution was to guarantee that all of the Six-Party Talks partners' interests were brought into play, the Deputy Secretary said, while also noting that Six-Party Talks partners' interests were similar, but not identical.
Key question: kim jong-il's calculus[カギになる金正日の損得計算法]------------------------------------
¶20. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary suggested that the key questions concerned Kim Jong-Il's
motivations, specifically how he viewed his interests, and how much emphasis
he placed on reaching a solution to the nuclear issue and normalization
of relations with the U.S. as part of his legacy. The Deputy Secretary
emphasized the need for continued, close dialogue with China.
Dprk not clearly committed to denuclearization[北朝鮮は非核化を約束せず]--------------------------------------
¶21. (S秘密) Ambassador DeTrani said that the U.S. assessed, largely as a result of XX不詳 seemingly successful efforts, that the DPRK was ready to return to multilateral talks on its nuclear program. The U.S. further assessed that North Korea at a strategic level had not committed to the goal of complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. North Korea wanted to be accepted as a nuclear state with ICBM capabilities. The DPRK's September 3 letter to the UN was indicative of this point. In the letter, the DPRK acknowledged that it had reprocessed spent fuel rods and extracted plutonium that was being weaponized, and after six years of denial, admitted to possessing a uranium enrichment program. A key question would be whether North Korea would negotiate while UNSC Resolution 1874 sanctions were still in place, Ambassador DeTrani noted.
¶22. (S秘密) Ambassador DeTrani observed that North Korea had established a pattern
of walking away from negotiations as a sign of displeasure, such as its
13-month hiatus from the Six-Party Talks after the U.S. had suggested it
possessed an HEU program and its similarly long absence in protest of reports
of money laundering through a Macau bank (BDA). In both of these instances,
the Six-Party Talks partners had conceded something, after which the DPRK
returned to the Talks. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that if
the Six-Party Talks partners did not concede something, the DPRK would
be reluctant to move the Six-Party process forward. Ambassador DeTrani
emphasized the shared U.S.-China objective in achieving progress in the
Six-Party Talks building upon the September 2005 joint statement that 武大偉was so instrumental in crafting.
China committed to 6-party talks, denuclearization--------------------------------------------- -----
¶23. (S秘密) The Six-Party Talks, on the whole, "have been positive," 武大偉 declared. 武大偉 recounted that he had told North Korean counterparts on numerous occasions
that the Six-Party Talks enabled the U.S. and North Korea to feel comfortable
with bilateral engagement. China supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral engagement,
and such contact would not affect U.S.-China relations, 武大偉 assured, allowing that other Six-Party Talks partners might not share
the same view.
¶24. (S) 武大偉 affirmed that China was committed to getting North Korea back to the negotiating table. In order to protect the gains that had been made and to advance the Six-Party Talks, all parties had to remain committed to the September 2005 joint statement on North Korea's denuclearization. 武大偉 allowed that in light of the current situation, it might be necessary
to refine the statement, but nonetheless, the September 2005 statement
had to serve as the starting point.
¶25. (S秘密) On North Korean denuclearization, 武大偉 agreed with the U.S. assessment that it would be difficult to obtain North
Korea's commitment. 北朝鮮の非核化はむずかしい。The U.S. should inform North Korea that
improved U.S.-DPRK relations depended upon verifiable steps toward denuclearization.米国は非核化への実証可能な段取りを望む。
武大偉 agreed with the U.S. assessment that North Korea had not made a strategic
decision to forego its nuclear weapons program. 核兵器化への戦略決定はまだ行われていないと見る点で米中が一致。North
Korea was looking in particular at its relations with the U.S. and was
not moved by Chinese representations of what steps the U.S. would be willing
to take. North Korea often insisted that it was an independent country
and did not like having China as a go-between with the U.S., according
to 武大偉. 北朝鮮は独立国であり、中国の仲介を望まない。米国との直接対話を望む。
China urges bilateral, multilateral combination[中国は2国・6国対話の組合せを主張]----------------------------
¶26. (S) 武大偉 proposed that Six-Party Talks partners consider using bilateral mechanisms
within the Six-Party Talks framework to improve relations with North Korea.
Through a combination of bilateral and multilateral channels, it might
be possible to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Because
the opportunity to persuade North Korea still existed, China would continue
making vigorous efforts in this pursuit. 武大偉 stressed that the Chinese government was serious about UNSC Resolution
1874 implementation, adding that there had not been any change in China's
¶27. (S) The Deputy Secretary agreed with 武大偉 basic conclusions, expressed appreciation for 武大偉 leadership on the North Korea issue, and reiterated the U.S. interest
in continued close contact with China. 武大偉 offered to provide a briefing for the U.S. immediately following Premier
Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang.
¶28. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message.
スタインバーグが2009年9月29日午後3時から中南海で戴秉国と会見した電信は「秘密」扱いだが、この電信にはXXX はない。中国側出席者の名も実名で書かれている(S E C R E T , BEIJING 002965)
主題「スタインバーグ副長官と戴秉国・国務委員との2009年9月29日北京会談」(SUBJECT: PRC: DEPUTY SECRETARY
STEINBERG'S SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 CONVERSATION WITH STATE COUNCILOR DAI BINGGUO)
Summary Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo discusses a visit to Pyongyang with American officials and the appearance
and behaviour of Kim Jong-il. Dai admits that he did not "dare" to be candid with Kim. Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind." Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite the Chinese official to "share some liquor
and wine", but that because of scheduling problems, he would have
to defer the offer.
1. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 3:00 p.m.; Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound; Beijing
2. (SBU) Participants: U.S.[米国側出席者]----
1.The Deputy Secretary スタインバーグ副長官
2.Amb. Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Embassy Beijing 北京駐在ハンツマン大使
3.Joseph Donovan, EAP East Asian and Pacific Affairs Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State 国務省アジア太平洋局次官補ドノバン
4. Rear Admiral Charles Leidig, ライディッグ准将Joint Chiefs of Staff
5.Amb. Joseph DeTrani, Mission Manager for North Korea, DNI トラニ大使
6.Derek Mitchell, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 国防次官補ミッチェル
7.Amb. Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks 6カ国会議キム大使
8.Pamela Park, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary スタインバーグ副長官パーク秘書
9.Nancy Leou, Embassy Political Officer (notetaker) 大使館政務秘書リュウ(記録係)
10.James Brown, Interpreterブラウン通訳
1.State Councilor Dai Bingguo戴秉国国務委員
2.Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei何亜非外交部副部長
3. Guan Youfei Ministry of National Defense, Deputy Director, International
4. Zheng Zeguang鄭則光外交部北米大洋州司長, Director General, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department
5. Zhang Kunsheng張昆生外交部礼賓司長, Director General, MFA Protocol Department
6.Yang Houlan楊厚蘭朝鮮半島事務大使, Ambassador for Korean Peninsula Issues
7. Li Song李滨外交部軍縮司副司長, Deputy Director General, MFA Arms Control and Disarmament Department
8.Cong Peiwu叢培武外交部参事官, Counselor, MFA North American and Oceanian Affairs Department
3. (S秘密) SUMMARY[要約]:
In a September 29 meeting with State Councilor Dai Bingguo, the Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of persuading Pyongyang
to return to the path of denuclearization. Dai said that the U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration and urged the two countries to avoid "setbacks." During his recent trip to North Korea, Dai said, he met with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il for two and one half hours and
Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health. Dai said he had urged Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. Dai's DPRK interlocutors had responded that they wanted bilateral engagement with the United States first and that they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks, depending on the outcome of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks. Dai said that Premier Wen's October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang would be another
opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear
issue. On Iran, Dai said China and the United States had the same objectives but that China
would work on Iran in its own way. China believed peaceful negotiation
would achieve a more meaningful resolution than sanctions would, and, Dai urged, the United States should be more patient. D responded that patience could not be unlimited in light of Iran's continued enrichment program in violation of UNSC resolutions. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China and the United States would work
together to prepare for President Obama's November visit to China. Dai supported the idea of a "concise and substantive" joint document
to be issued in conjunction with the visit. End Summary.
Full Strategy to Address North Korea[対北朝鮮への全体戦略]---------
4. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary met with State Councilor Dai Bingguo for an eighty-minute discussion[80分の会談] on North Korea, Iran, and the U.S.-China relationship on September 29. The Deputy Secretary stressed the importance of fashioning a full strategy to address the DPRK nuclear issue and having a unified position among Six-Party Talks partners and allies that would lead to an effective and diplomatic resolution of the problem. He expressed support for Premier Wen Jiabao's October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang and said both countries should work to persuade Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks and to reaffirm the 2005 Joint Statement. The United States was prepared to have meaningful, substantive engagement with a senior North Korean official and would use the any bilateral discussion to encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The Deputy Secretary expressed appreciation for China's efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1874.
U.S.-China Relations on Positive Track[米中2国関係のトラック]--------------
5. (S秘密) State Councilor Dai said that President Obama and President Hu had had several opportunities
to meet in recent months. After watching the two leaders interact in New
York, Dai observed, the two presidents appeared to be "old friends." Dai thanked the U.S. Government for its "careful arrangements" for
President Hu's visit to New York, as well as for National People's Congress
Chairman Wu Bangguo's recent, successful visit to the United States. Dai expressed appreciation to President Obama, Secretary Clinton and Treasury
Secretary Geithner for their personal contributions in making the Strategic
and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) a great success. Dai was confident that the S&ED would have a positive global impact and confided that China had already begun thinking about the next round. The U.S.-China relationship was off to a good start under the new U.S. administration despite some "unpleasant things." Dai urged the two countries to keep up a good momentum in the bilateral relationship
and to work hard t o avoid "setbacks."
Dai's Visit to Pyongyang[戴秉国の平壌訪問]-----------
6. (S秘密) Regarding his recent visit to Pyongyang, Dai briefly recounted his two-hour meeting with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il. Dai said he was on relatively familiar terms with Kim, because he had met
with Kim on several occasions in his previous role as Director of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison Department
(CCID). Dai admitted that in contrast with his discussion with Vice FM Kang (see below)
his conversation with Kim was not as direct and candid and joked that he
"did not dare" to be that candid with the DPRK leader. Dai noted that Kim had lost weight when compared to when he last saw him three years earlier, but that Kim appeared to be in reasonably good health and still had a "sharp mind." Kim told Dai that he had hoped to invite the Chinese official to share some liquor and wine, but that because of scheduling problems, he would have to defer the offer to Dai's next visit to North Korea. Kim Jong-il had a reputation among the Chinese for being "quite a
good drinker," and, Dai said, he had asked Kim if he still drank alcohol.
Kim said yes. [米大使館が強調した箇所]Dai said he also met briefly with Kim Yong-nam, President of the Supreme People's Assembly, who invited him to attend the performance of a famous Chinese opera, "The Dream of the Red Chamber."
7. (S秘密) Dai said that he had had frank and blunt discussions with DPRK First Vice
Foreign Minister Kang Suk-ju that totaled over two and one half hours.
Dai said he told Kang that denuclearization should be Pyongyang's first choice and that it was important for North Korea to return to Six-Party Talks. He had stressed to Kang that the Six-Party Talks mechanism was useful and explained that the ultimate resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue could not be resolved without the participation of the Six Parties. According to Dai, Kang responded that North Korea was still committed to the goal of denuclearization.
Dai believed that the North Koreans had not categorically denied the Six-Party
Talks and opined that under the right circumstances, it might be possible
to revive the Six-Party Talks process. Dai's North Korean interlocutors had emphasized the strong security threat
it faced. The North Koreans told Dai that they wanted to have dialogue with the United States first and that
they would consider next steps, including possible multilateral talks,
depending on their conversation with the United States. North Korea held
"great expectations for the United States," said Dai. DPRK officials had told Dai that North Korea viewed former President Clinton's visit to Pyongyang
8. (S秘密) Even though he had not had an opportunity to visit or observe any place other than Pyongyang, Dai said, his impression of North Korea was that the domestic situation appeared stable and normal. Dai opined that the DPRK appeared focused on two issues: improving its relationship
with the United States and developing its economy.
U.S.-DPRK Bilateral Engagement[米朝2国関係]----------------
9. (S秘密) China was aware that the United States was considering possible re-engagement
with North Korea and supported U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions, said Dai. With bilateral dialogue, there was "no limit to how far you could
go." China appreciated U.S. understanding and support for Premier
Wen's upcoming visit to Pyongyang. President Hu had already informed President
Obama of the trip. Dai explained that it would have been "impolite" for China to not reciprocate with a high-level visit to Pyongyang after DPRK Premier Kim Yong-il had visited Beijing in March for the 60th anniversary celebration of Sino-DPRK ties. Wen's visit would provide an opportunity for China and North Korea to exchange views on the nuclear issue, stated Dai.
10. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary thanked Dai for sharing his perceptions of the North Korea nuclear issue and stressed
that President Obama wanted to make clear to the North Korean people and
to Kim Jong-il that the United States did not have any hostile intent toward
North Korea. The United States was ready to move forward to normalize relations
with North Korea if Pyongyang moved toward denuclearization. The Deputy
Secretary expressed hope that North Korea would agree to a meeting between
Ambassador Bosworth and First VFM Kang Suk-ju to achieve that goal.
11. (S秘密) The Deputy Secretary said the United States valued the joint effort it took to create the P5-plus-1 foreign ministers statement on Iran. He acknowledged that the United States and Iran had a long and complicated history of mistrust. The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives and stressed that all sides had to take confidence-building steps that would lead to a diplomatic resolution. Recent disclosures by Iran underscored the need to deal with the issue urgently, and it was important that Iran give a strong signal during the October 1 meeting that demonstrated it was ready for serious engagement.
12. (S秘密) Dai responded that China and the United States saw eye to eye on the Iran
nuclear issue. Nuclear states should reduce their nuclear arsenal with
the goal of eventual elimination and should work to prevent other nations,
including Iran, from developing nuclear weapons. However, China and the
United States had different considerations on how we advanced these goals.
With a history of mistrust and mutual suspicion between the United States
and Iran, it would not be easy to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. Dai urged the United States to have more patience, address Iran's legitimate
concerns, and work to identify and expand on the positive areas in the
13. (S秘密) Dai characterized President Obama's policy to resolve issues through dialogue
and engagement as "wise." Sanctions might work up to a point,
but China believed peaceful negotiation would achieve a more meaningful
resolution. Dai warned that pressing too hard might risk antagonizing Iran. Iran was not
a small country, it had a long history and culture, and its people were
not dumb. Dai urged the United States to resolve the issue in a "smart" manner.
One meeting would not be able to resolve all problems, so the United States
lower its expectation for the October 1 meeting. China would work on Iran
in its own way and would urge Iran to seize the window of opportunity.
Dai said China and the United States had the same objective, but said that
each country would play a different role in achieving that objective.
14. (S秘密) The Deputy replied that it was Iran that was "impatient" in its ongoing program of uranium enrichment in violation of the UNSC resolutions. The U.S. and the P5 1 would be more willing to be patient in discussions if Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment and forgo its overall? program. This would create an appropriate context for all sides to address underlying issues of concern.
U.S. National Security Strategy[米国の安保戦略]-------------
15. (S秘密) Noting the Deputy's interest in "strategy" Dai asked whether the Obama administration had an overarching national security strategy. the Deputy Secretary said that the National Security Strategy, which would likely be issued before the end of the year, would articulate the administration's global strategy. He noted that the Secretary had recently identified major themes during her speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, including the importance of global cooperation in confronting today's challenges. In that context, the U.S.-China relationship would play a core role. Dai said he looked forward to reading the strategy paper.
President Obama Visit to China[オバマ訪中]---------------
16. (S秘密) Dai said that President Obama had recently told President Hu that he looked
forward to having a "magnificent" visit to China. Asked how China
could help achieve this, the Deputy Secretary said the two countries should
seek to demonstrate to our peoples and to the international community how
the U.S.-China relationship would help address global challenges in areas
such as public health, nonproliferation and the environment. The two countries
should seek to demonstrate how U.S.-China ties were between the two peoples,
not just between the governments, diplomats and leaders. Dai assured the Deputy Secretary that China would work with the U.S. to prepare
a successful visit. It would be "great," said Dai, if the two sides could agree on language for the joint visit document that would be "concise, as well as substantive."
Global Nuclear Security Summit[核安保サミット]-----------
17. (S秘密) Asked about U.S.-sought outcomes and goals for the Nuclear Security Summit, the Deputy Secretary explained that President Obama had laid out the three pillars of his nuclear policy during his Prague speech. The Nuclear Security Summit was designed to focus on one of those pillars-the need to safeguard nuclear material against theft or diversion. The risk of proliferation had increased with the expansion of new nuclear power programs and with the existence of unsecured legacy nuclear materials in former Soviet states. We needed to have assurances that the peaceful development of nuclear power programs and nuclear research did not pose proliferation risks.
The Same Boat[同舟共済]-------
18. (S秘密) The U.S.-China relationship was of crucial importance, said Dai. China would do its best to cooperate with the United States wherever
possible. "If we expand the pie for the common interest, the pie will
be larger and more delicious." Together, the two sides should work
collaboratively for the good of the world, especially since the two countries
were "passengers in the same boat." Dai urged careful management of the relationship and respect for each other's
core interests and concerns.
19. (U) The Deputy Secretary cleared this message.
米国ソウル大使館2010年2月22日発、米国務省宛て、秘密電信「韓国の千英宇外務次官が米スチーブンス大使に語った朝中関係」(22 February 2010, 09:32 S E C R E T SEOUL 000272 SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS)
1. (S秘密) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo千英宇told the Ambassador February 17th
that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the
death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three
years after the death of Kim Jong-il. 最も話題になった箇所。北朝鮮はすでに経済的に破綻しており、金正日の死後2～3年で政治的に破産するであろう。Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump
10 billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to
force a change in Pyongyang's policies北京はピョンヤンに経済的圧力をかけて政策を変えさせるつもりはない。 -- and the DPRK characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" -- had retained his
position as chief of the PRC's 6PT delegation. 中国で最も無能な役人[武大偉]が6カ国会議の中国代表だとピョンヤンは特徴づけた。Describing a generational difference in Chinese attitudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed 武大偉 believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship
would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula.End summary.
VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations------------------------------------------
2. (S秘密) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Ambassador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry's "briefing" to the ROK embassy in Beijing on Wang Jiarui's 王家瑞visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding
that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions
like whether Wang had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.
3. (S秘密) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization.
4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei 武大偉had retained his position as chief of the PRC's delegation. 武大偉が中国代表に留任したのはまずいこと。XX ［Chunか］said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard"
for the now-retired Wu 武大偉to stay on as China's 6pt chief. 武大偉の留任は、北朝鮮のロビー工作による。（NAME REMOVED）［Chunか］ complained that Wu武大偉 is the PRC's XX an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English." Wu 武大偉was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming -- to anyone willing to listen -- that the PRC's economic
rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great
China's "New Generation" of Korea - Hands中国新世代の北朝鮮専門家は緩衝地不要論-----------------
5. (S秘密) Sophisticated Chinese officials XX不詳 stood in sharp contrast to Wu武大偉, according to VFM Chun. XX Chun claimed
XX不詳 believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. XX不詳, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state -- a view that since North Korea's 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders. ここでいう洗練された新世代の外交官とは、英語に堪能な前任者王毅ではないか。
PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario北朝鮮崩壊時に中国は何をするか--------------------
6. (S秘密) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would
clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the
DMZ. XX不詳 Chun XX said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled
by Seoul and anchored to the United States in a "benign alliance " 中国は韓国主導下の南北統一を支持する-- as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and
labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also
help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed
the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a
DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie
with the United States, Japan, and South Korea -- not North Korea. Moreover,
Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal
crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority
7. (S秘密) Chun acknowledged the Ambassador's point that a strong ROK-Japan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean
Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun asserted that, even though "Japan's preference" was to
keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in
the event the DPRK collapses.